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This article considers the litigation in Ghai v Newcastle City Council in which the legality of 
open air funeral pyres under the Cremation Act 1902, and under the right to freedom of 
religion and belief in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was 
considered.  Ultimately the Court of Appeal held that open air funeral pyres within a walled 
enclosure were not unlawful.  But at first instance the Administrative Court, which had 
assumed that domestic law prohibited such pyres, had held that such a ban would not breach 
article 9 since it was legitimate to prevent causing offence to the majority of the population.  
It is the approach of the Administrative Court to article 9 (which was not considered by the 
Court of Appeal) that forms the basis of the critical analysis in this article.  In particular it is 
argued that the Administrative Court undervalued the right to freedom of religion and belief, 
as against the need to prevent offence to others, and adopted a stance which was overly 
deferential to Government and Parliament. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The rituals that surround the disposal of the dead are one of our species‘ defining 
characteristics.
1
 As well as the very practical need of having to dispose of a lifeless corpse, 
death rituals tend to serve many other functions.
2
 These range from commemorating the 
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passing of a human life and facilitating public expressions of grief,
3
 to impacting upon group 
identity,
4
 and demonstrating a belief in an afterlife.
5
 Yet whilst disposal of the dead has, from 
time immemorial, been a universal problem, the way in which humans have traditionally 
gone about this task has differed considerably.
6
 As a consequence, from Egyptian mummies 
and Indian cremations to Eastern ancestor rites and African sacrificial ceremonies, every 
culture has its own set of traditions that are synonymous with death.
7
  
 The fact that rituals surrounding death tend to be a paradigm exemplar of religious 
and cultural difference, should perhaps come as no great surprise. In death, as in life, the 
traditions of every culture are diverse, moulded by a variety of social, political, religious and 
environmental factors.
8
 Yet the emotive nature of death perhaps explains why religious belief 
is such a powerful influence in shaping the way in which every culture views death.
9
 
Accordingly, it is hardly a shock to discover that there are many important differences 
between Christian funerary rites,
10
 and those found within the Buddhist,
11
 Hindu,
12
 Jewish,
13
 
Islamic
14
 or Sikh
15
 traditions.  
 Perhaps mindful of such considerations the eminent English anthropologist, William 
HR Rivers, once observed that ‗[f]ew customs of mankind take so firm a hold of his 
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imagination as his modes of disposing of the bodies of his dead‘.16 Yet whilst these words 
convey a seemingly immutable truth, British social attitudes to death and related funeral rites 
have changed significantly in the century since Rivers published his work. For example, 
today, crematoria are found in practically every town, due to the fact that a majority of British 
people choose to be cremated in such places after death. But it was not always so. Less than 
two hundred years ago burial of the dead, rather then cremation, was the norm in Britain.
17
 
Accordingly, from the period when legal restrictions on cremation were lifted (from 1852-
1884), to its ultimate ‗popularisation‘ (since 1952), the British public‘s approach to cremation 
has shifted dramatically.
18
 As a consequence, when a person dies today in Britain it is the 
norm for their body (having been prepared by an undertaker) to be kept in a closed coffin, 
immediately prior to its disposal in a crematorium. 
 But what if a person wishes that their body after death be neither cremated in a 
crematorium nor be interred in the ground? What if such a request is (in their opinion) 
mandated by their religion or culture? Is there a human right to dispose of the body of the 
deceased even if it is done in a way that is at odds with existing social norms or might even 
cause offence to others? How far does contemporary Britain, which places great store by 
respecting racial and religious diversity in life, accord respect to such matters in death?   
 Such matters are not merely sterile matters of academic conjecture. On the contrary, 
they have recently been considered by the British Courts. In Ghai v Newcastle City Council,
19
 
the Administrative Court held that an (apparent) statutory ban preventing a Hindu man, 
Davender Ghai, having his remains cremated on an open air funeral pyre, in accordance with 
his belief that this was the only way in which the cycle of birth and rebirth could progress, 
was not in breach of his right to freedom of religion and belief under article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It was justifiable, the Administrative Court held, for 
the state to prohibit open air cremation in order to prevent offence being caused to those in 
the United Kingdom who would object to this practice.  The Court of Appeal subsequently 
upheld Mr Ghai‘s appeal but not on the basis that his article 9 rights had been breached.  
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Rather, it held that the kind of cremation acceptable to Mr Ghai‘s beliefs (funeral pyre 
cremation within a roofless walled enclosure) was not contrary to English law after all.
20
 The 
Court of Appeal, since it was able to dispose of the issue using the traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation, did not need to consider human rights issues that had been addressed 
by the Administrative Court.  Notwithstanding this successful appeal, this article analyses the 
Administrative Court‘s approach to the article 9 issues raised in Ghai, which remain 
untouched by the Court of Appeal‘s decision.  It questions the reasoning of Cranston J in a 
number of respects, and attacks the Administrative Court for having taken what it regards as 
an overly conservative approach to the application of article 9. It concludes by pointing out 
some ironic consequences highlighted by the litigation, concerning the protection of religious 
freedom under the Human Rights Act 1998  
 
2.   THE LAW ON CREMATION AND GHAI  V NEWCASTLE CITY COUNCIL  
Davender Ghai, an orthodox Hindu, believed that in order to achieve a ‗good death‘ and 
successful passage to the afterlife, his remains needed to be cremated on an outdoor funeral 
pyre, a Vedic rite known as the anthyesthi sanskara.  Anything less would have ‗devastating 
effects for him in the afterlife‘, interrupting his cycle of birth and rebirth, possibly 
irreparably.
21
  Newcastle City Council refused his request, maintaining that UK law 
prohibited open air cremation. Mr Ghai sought a judicial review of that decision, claiming a 
breach of article 9 of the ECHR.  The Secretary of State for Justice (the Minister responsible 
for cremation law), as well as a Sikh temple and an organisation advocating natural burial 
methods, all made representations in their capacities (respectively) as an interested party and 
first and second  interveners. 
 The law concerning cremation that was applicable in Ghai is contained in the 
Cremation Act 1902. ‗Crematorium‘ is defined as ‗... any building fitted with appliances for 
the purpose of burning human remains‘.22 The Secretary of State is empowered to make 
regulations concerning the conditions for burning human remains,
23
 and it an offence to 
knowingly carry out the burning of human remains except in accordance with the 
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regulations.
24
 The most recent regulations are the Crematorium (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2008, which define cremation as the ‗burning of human remains‘, and they 
provide that no cremation may take place except in a crematorium the opening of which has 
been notified to the Secretary of State.
25
  
 Having lost at first instance (see below) Mr Ghai appealed to the Court of Appeal 
which heard representations that his  religious belief would be satisfied if his funeral pyre 
was located within a walled structure, as long as it was possible for sunlight to shine directly 
on the body during cremation.
26
  This clarification of the appellant‘s position led to the Court 
of Appeal giving the term ‗building‘ in section 2 of the Cremation Act its ‗natural and 
relatively wide meaning‘ so as to encompass this kind of structure.27  As a result this kind of 
open air cremation was found not to be unlawful; and consequently no human rights issues 
fell to be considered by the Court of Appeal.
28
   
 At the Administrative Court Cranston J had held, based upon the understanding  that a 
fully open cremation was required by Mr Ghai‘s beliefs, that the combined effect of the 
legislation and the regulations was plain: that ‗the burning of human remains, other than in a 
building, such as on an open air pyre, [was] an offence‘.29 He therefore went on to analyse 
whether the (supposed) legislative ban on funeral pyre cremation constituted a breach of 
article 9 of the ECHR.
 30
  It is to this analysis to which the remainder of this article now turns.
 
 
 The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly affirmed the importance of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as being ‗one of the foundations of a democratic 
society [and] one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
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their conception of the good life [as well as being] a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned.‘31 Article 9 protects, in absolute terms, one‘s freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. Thus, a person can believe whatever they want, with the 
state lacking any power to interfere with this internal sphere, the forum internum. In contrast, 
however, the manifestation of religion or belief may be subject to the imposition of 
restrictions by the state as long as such restrictions are in accordance with the three criteria 
under article 9(2) − ‗prescribed by law‘, in pursuance of one of the legitimate aims listed, and 
‗necessary in a democratic society,‘ with this last requirement meaning that any restriction 
must be proportionate to the aim that the state is claiming to protect.
32
  
 In conducting the article 9 analysis, Cranston J addressed a series of questions set out 
by the House of Lords in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
33
 
First, were the claimant‘s beliefs religious? In answering this question in the affirmative, the 
Court held that they ‗clearly‘ were.34 Secondly, was athyesthi sanskara a manifestation of a 
genuine belief held in good faith?  The Court held that it was,
35
 for while certain ‗minimum 
thresholds relating to seriousness, coherence and conformity‘ had to be satisfied,36 and it was 
a question for the court to decide whether open air cremation was an essential belief of one 
strand of orthodox Hinduism, it was ‗emphatically not for the court to embark on an inquiry 
as to the validity of a belief by some standard such as a religious text or whether it conforms 
or differs from that of others professing the same religion‘.37 Furthermore, Cranston J 
reasoned that whilst the belief must be:  
 
... coherent in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood ... too 
much should not be demanded in this regard. Typically religion involves belief in the 
supernatural. It is not always susceptible to lucid exposition or, still less, rational 
justification. The language used is often the language of allegory, symbol and 
metaphor.  Depending on the subject matter, individuals cannot always be expected to 
express themselves with cogency and precision.
38
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The Court noted that the position was, however, different for Sikhs. The first intervener, a 
Sikh Gurdwara, did not claim that open air cremation was a matter of ‗doctrine and dogma‘, 
but was rather a ‗traditional practice‘ advocated by the Sikh Code of Conduct. In view of the 
fact that Christians and Muslims had burial grounds allocated to them, it was argued that 
Sikhs should also have their practices recognised.
39
 However, Cranston J held that since open 
air pyres were only a ‗matter of tradition for Sikhs in India‘ rather than a tenet of ‗dogma and 
belief‘, article 9 accorded them no protection on this issue.40 
 What was beyond dispute in this case (at first instance) was that by placing curbs on 
the burning of human remains, the 1902 Act and the 2008 Regulations clearly constituted an 
interference with the manifestation of a person‘s belief, contrary to article 9(1) of the ECHR. 
Accordingly, the next question which had to be answered was whether such a restriction 
could be justified under article 9(2), as pursuing a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. 
 The Secretary of State had originally argued that the ‗legitimate aim‘ which justified 
banning open air funeral pyres lay in the need to prevent risks to the environment and threats 
to the safety of bystanders, due to the release of dioxins, mercury emissions and polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons. However, these public health and environmental arguments were 
abandoned once it was accepted that such concerns could be dealt with through regulation.
41
 
Instead, the Secretary of State proceeded to argue that the ban was justifiable on the basis that 
it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public morals and the rights of others, since ‗a 
large proportion of the population of this country would be upset and offended by open air 
funeral pyres and would find it abhorrent that human remains were being burned in this 
manner‘.42  
 The Administrative Court accepted that protecting public morals and the rights of 
others was indeed a legitimate aim of the ban; but it had next to consider whether the ban 
constituted a proportionate interference in pursuit of that aim—ie, did the requirement that 
cremation take place in a building strike a ‗fair balance‘ between the rights of the claimant 
and the interests of society?
43
 Cranston J, having taken into account various ‗backdrop 
features‘ (discussed in part 3 below), and declaring that he intended ‗now [to] meet the 
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central issue head on‘,44 held that the prohibition did not breach article 9 because the 
Secretary of State  was entitled to conclude: 
 
... that the present legislative framework [was] consistent with mainstream cultural 
expectations of persons living in this country and secure[d] in a practical way the 
avoidance of likely offence and distress. That calculation [was] not one on which a 
judge c[ould] speak with any great expertise or authority. The resolution of the 
various competing interests on this difficult and delicate issue by elected 
representatives [was] not one a court should easily set aside. It [was] within the remit 
of the Secretary of State to conclude ... that a significant number of people would find 
both the principle and the reality of cremation by means of open air pyres to be a 
matter of offence.
45
 
 
As a result, Cranston J concluded that the claimant, in relation to his article 9 claim, should 
‗[p]ursue his cause in the public sphere, by campaigning, lobbying and the use of other 
avenues open to him in a democratic society to try to effect a change in the legislative 
framework.‘46  
 
 
3.   A CRITIQUE OF THE ‗BACKDROP FEATURES‘  
According to Cranston J, several features in this case formed a ‗backdrop‘ to the 
Administrative Court‘s decision to deny Mr Ghai an open air cremation. Yet whilst these 
factors were referred to as ‗backdrop features‘, we suggest that in reality their enumeration 
by Cranston J was the proportionality analysis in this case. After all, this was the only point 
in his judgment at which the competing interests were balanced against each other—and it 
was immediately thereafter (and without any further analysis) that Cranston J held the matter 
of open air cremations should essentially be a decision for Government and Parliament rather 
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than a court.
47
 Given that these backdrop features underpin the determination of the article 9 
issue in this case, they warrant a more detailed analysis.  
 
i) No blanket interference with the claimant’s article 9 rights 
The first backdrop feature noted was that there had been ‗no blanket interference with the 
claimant‘s article 9 rights‘ ... ‗as an orthodox Hindu [he] ha[d] a very wide freedom in this 
country to manifest his religious beliefs [and that] in effect the only interference he 
complain[ed] of [was] the requirement that his funeral take place in a building‘.48   
 This, with respect, rather misses the point: all that Davender Ghai sought was the 
right to an open air cremation. The fact that he could still manifest his belief in any number of 
other ways was of little relevance to his central contention (which the Court accepted was 
held in good faith), that his failure to perform the rite of anthyesthi sanskara would ‗have 
devastating effects for him in the afterlife‘.49 For Mr Ghai, denial of this particular ceremony 
would mean that proper performance of all his other religious duties (which were not 
interfered with) would count for nought. Accordingly, for the Court to suggest that Mr Ghai 
remained free to do other things required by his belief seems hardly relevant to his central 
claim that it was restriction of this ‗pivotal‘ sacrament that breached his article 9 rights. 
 
ii) The majority of Hindus do not consider open air cremation to be essential 
The second backdrop factor considered by Cranston J was ‗that the vast majority of Hindus in 
this country do not consider that cremation on an open air pyre is essential to discharge their 
religious obligations‘.50 Such reasoning brings to mind previous case law of the European 
Court
51
 and (previously) Commission
52
 of Human Rights in Strasbourg, whereby a religious 
practice must be deemed ‗necessary‘ for it to come within article 9(1) of the ECHR.53 By 
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focusing on the manifestation of a religion or belief rather than its motivation,
54
 this approach 
has the advantage of excluding bogus or trivial beliefs from article 9(1)
55
 − yet it also comes 
close to adjudicating on whether a particular practice is formally required by a religion, a task 
which judges (given the relevant theological issues) appear ill-equipped to handle. Moreover, 
this approach is typically based on the questionable assumption that every religion has a 
single clearly discernable text, which is not open to different interpretations. Thus, in Ghai, 
the extent to which the Court should have taken into account the views of most Hindus on the 
matter of open air funeral pyres is questionable. From the Pilgrim Fathers to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948), religious freedom has been predicated on the 
assumption that a believer has the right to depart from the majority view and act according to 
his/her beliefs. Indeed, it is only because of the existence of a wide range of world views 
(including atypical ones) that rules exist (both nationally and internationally) governing 
freedom of religion and belief—were it were otherwise, such legal provisions would surely 
be unnecessary.  
 It is important to bear in mind that, at an earlier stage in its analysis, when considering 
whether anthyesthi sanskara was an ‗essential belief of one strand of orthodox Hinduism‘, 
the Court acknowledged that the fact that the ‗great majority of Hindus in the United 
Kingdom do not share the claimant‘s belief [was] not a complete answer‘.56 Thus, having 
apparently, and (it is submitted) rightly, minimised the importance of the relevance of 
majority beliefs when assessing whether open air cremation was a core aspect of Hindu 
belief, it is perhaps surprising that this issue re-emerged as part of the ‗backdrop‘ to the 
proportionality analysis.  
 
(iii) Cremation law is outdated 
The third backdrop factor related to Ghai‘s submission that the law was outdated because the 
legal definition of a crematorium (ie, a ‗building fitted with appliances for the purpose of 
burning human remains‘) dated back to 1902, and that ‗the balance it struck could no longer 
be regarded as valid‘.57 With this in mind Cranston J suggested that there was ‗no significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention ‗excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs … are 
legitimate‘. 
54
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56
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evidence that on the disposal of human remains any significant cultural change ha[d] 
occurred since then.‘58 Furthermore, in rejecting Ghai‘s argument, he noted that the 2008 
Cremation Regulations had been subject to public consultation, and that faith groups 
(including the Hindu Forum of Britain), had been sent copies of the Consultation paper.
59
 
 Hindu and other religious groups may indeed have been consulted in relation to 
cremation practices, but the contention that cultural expectations on any issue have not 
changed since the Edwardian age is surely doubtful.
60
 The last century has witnessed the 
transformation of Britain from a (predominantly) ethnically and religiously homogenous 
nation into a racially and religiously diverse society.
61
 Indeed, much has already been written 
on how British attitudes, practices and beliefs about death have undergone significant change 
in recent decades.
62
 Thus, any assumption that cultural norms governing the disposal of the 
dead are as they were in 1902 is extremely questionable. After all, there have been significant 
changes in relation to the practice of cremation, not least in relation to the fact that in 1960 
less than one in three corpses were cremated, whereas today more than 70 per cent of deaths 
lead to cremations in Britain.
63
 Furthermore, with regard to the 2008 Regulations, it should be 
noted that the Government consultation paper which preceded them, stated that: 
 
We recognise that some faiths would prefer to cremate the remains of a member of 
that faith on what is known as a funeral pyre.  Any question as to whether the 
regulations permit funeral pyres is a matter for the courts and outside the scope of 
these regulations.
64
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This certainly would appear to be some kind of (tacit) acknowledgment, by the Government 
at any rate, that there have indeed been significant cultural changes in this area. 
 
(iv) An absence of any European consensus on funeral pyres 
The fourth backdrop factor identified by Cranston J was the absence of any European 
consensus on the issue of funeral pyres. According to the evidence adduced by the Secretary 
of State, ‗no other Council of Europe state ... indicated that it permitted funeral pyres‘, while 
the embassies of twelve Council of Europe states confirmed that they did not permit them. 
Thus, material such as this ‗provided support for the conclusion that the [prohibition on 
funeral pyres was] proportionate and lawful‘.65 
 In view of the historical influence of Christianity in Europe, a faith which (until 
comparatively recently) has viewed cremation in negative terms,
66
 it is perhaps unsurprising 
that other European nations do not permit funeral pyres.
67
 This is especially so given that 
most other European countries have relatively small Hindu populations, particularly in 
comparison with the sizeable numbers of Hindus living in the UK. Yet, there is perhaps a 
more fundamental objection to Cranston J‘s decision to identify this particular issue as a 
backdrop factor. It is difficult to see why the absence of a consensus across Europe should be 
one of the factors leading to a finding by a domestic court that such a ban is proportionate in 
the United Kingdom.  
 The fact that it is ‗not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of 
the significance of religion in society‘ is certainly something that the European Court of 
Human Rights takes into account when it chooses to afford states a widened margin of 
appreciation in cases involving religion.
68
 But the issue of funeral pyres has not (as yet) been 
litigated before the Strasbourg Court. Accordingly, there is no case law on the subject which, 
by virtue of section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, must be ‗taken into account‘ by UK 
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courts.
69
 The Ghai court, by adopting one aspect of the Strasbourg Court‘s methodology 
(which is very much a product of that court‘s supra-national character), was necessarily 
tending towards a ‗lowest European common denominator‘ approach. Such an approach will 
inevitably lead to a dilution of protection for the right to manifest one‘s religious belief in the 
UK. It is surely questionable whether it is appropriate for a national court to count this as one 
of the factors contributing to its own deferential stance on the question of proportionality.
70
 
 
v) Open air cremation could cause offence  
The final and, perhaps, most troubling backdrop feature in Ghai relates to the ‗legitimate aim‘ 
criterion relied on by the Secretary of State for the prohibition of funeral pyres. This was the 
view that ‗a large proportion of the population of this country would be upset and offended 
by open air funeral pyres and would find it abhorrent that human remains were being burned 
in this manner‘.71 While the Secretary of the State will doubtlessly have reflected the views of 
some, his reasoning can be criticised on the basis that it is questionable whether the 
proscription of otherwise harmless conduct can ever be justified merely on the grounds that it 
may cause offence.
72
 At the very least there are serious difficulties in assessing whether the 
(subjective) intensity of perceived offence is sufficient to justify a criminal sanction, because 
what one person finds offensive ‗may be water off a duck‘s back to another‘.73 As Joel 
Feinberg has convincingly argued, ‗there are abundant reasons ... for being extremely 
cautious in applying the offense principle‘.74 
 However, even notwithstanding these difficulties, the kind of offence with which the 
Administrative Court was concerned was of an exceptionally attenuated variety. In other 
words, all of the parties accepted that arrangements could have been made whereby there 
would have been no or very little prospect of anyone witnessing funeral pyres who did not 
wish to do so. Cremations would be in secluded places, out of public view, and the chance of 
the public ‗stumbling on a funeral pyre was remote [given that] sufficient signs could be 
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deployed warning people of the site‘.75 What is more, anyone who considered such funeral 
rites to be offensive, and/or mourners of a ‗sensitive disposition‘ would be free, quite simply, 
to absent themselves.
76
 The Administrative Court in Ghai was concerned, therefore, not with 
direct offence being caused to those observing funeral pyres with their own senses but, rather, 
with a secondary, or indirect, form of offence.  
 In this regard, perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of Cranston J‘s ruling was 
his reliance on the European Court‘s decision in Otto Preminger Institute v Austria, in which 
an anti-religious satirical film was banned by the Austrian authorities in the Tyrol region on 
the basis that it would be offensive to the Roman Catholic majority in the area.
 77
 The 
Strasbourg Court held that the ban did not breach the right to freedom of expression under 
article 10 of the ECHR, since it fell within the state‘s margin of appreciation, even though the 
applicants had argued that the film would only be seen by (and therefore risk causing offence 
to) those who chose to see it.
78
 Nevertheless, the European Court held that ‗there was 
sufficient public knowledge of the basic content of the film to give a clear indication of its 
nature, such that it was capable in and of itself of causing offence, even though those 
offended had not been to see it‘.79 Cranston J held that the ‗same principle must apply‘ to 
funeral pyres.
80
 The distress being prevented was therefore not that of people witnessing at 
first hand burning human bodies, but rather the sensibilities of people who would find the 
mere idea of funeral pyres ‗in and of it itself‘ offensive.81  
 Cranston J‘s reasoning in this regard is again open to serious question. In his work 
exploring the moral limits of the criminal law, Joel Feinberg argues that such attenuated 
forms of offence should not form the basis of criminal liability. He draws a parallel with the 
proposition that a ‗keg of nails by the side of the road [is not] a public nuisance because it 
frightens an unduly skittish horse.‘ Feinberg goes on to say: 
 
Human beings who take offence at remarkably little provocation should have the 
same standing in law courts as skittish horses. The most ―skittish‖ imaginable person 
is he who suffers acute disgust and revulsion, shock to sensibilities, shameful 
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embarrassment, annoyance, frustration, resentment or humiliation not from something 
he sees, feels, smells or hears, but rather from unseen activities he knows or fears may 
be happening beyond his ken...  
If ―bare knowledge‖ that discreet and harmless ―immoralities‖ are occurring in private 
leads to severe mental distress, we should attribute the distress to abnormal 
susceptibilities rather than the precipitating cause. We don‘t punish persons when 
their normally harmless and independently valuable (at least to themselves) activities 
happen to startle a skittish horse whose presence was unsuspected. Rather we expect 
owners of skittish horses to keep them away from ―startling‖ activities and to take 
steps to cure their skittishness.
82
 
 
The Administrative Court‘s decision in Ghai does just this – it protects the sensibilities of the 
most queasy, the ‗most skittish‘ in the population at the expense of the profoundly held 
beliefs of the individual. 
 A further criticism of this aspect of the Administrative Court‘s approach in Ghai is 
that it is highly questionable whether people have the right not to be offended as asserted in 
Otto Preminger.
83
 The philosopher James Griffin, when considering the tradeoffs between 
human rights and other values, has argued that: 
 
there are values such that a certain amount of the one cannot be outweighed by any 
amount of the other. ... it seems to me that, if what is at stake is my reasonable 
conception of a good life [or good death?] then no amount of mere upset and distress 
for members of my community could outweigh it; it would not matter if a hundred 
people were upset and distressed, or a thousand, or a million.
84
 
 
However, even if it is conceded that such a right not to be caused offence can be derived 
from article 10(2) as Otto Preminger suggests, this right cannot be seen as conferring a carte 
blanche on states to restrict any offensive expression or conduct.
85
 Indeed, in Otto Preminger 
itself the European Court stated that the obligation on states is to ‗avoid as far as possible 
expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their 
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rights‘.86 There seems, therefore, to be a requirement that in order for interference with 
freedom of expression to be justified, the offence caused to religious sensibilities must be 
gratuitous.   
 In stark contrast, the Administrative Court in Ghai accepted that the claimant 
genuinely believed that open air cremation was a vital part of his cycle of existence, denial of 
which would have ‗devastating consequences‘ for him in the afterlife.87 On the Court‘s own 
finding, Mr Ghai could in no way be described as requiring a funeral pyre just for the sake of 
it, gratuitously.
88
 His reasons were of absolute centrality to his existence. Even if it had been 
accepted that others would (or could) be offended by the knowledge of funeral pyres taking 
place, it could not even remotely be contended that such offence would be caused 
‗gratuitously‘, a requirement which the European Court‘s test in Otto Preminger seems to 
demand.   
 Cranston J relied heavily on Otto Preminger in Ghai, but it is important to note that 
the European Court has apparently moved away from Otto Preminger in recent years. Today 
it is doubtful whether article 9 affords protection to one‘s religious feelings over and above 
other kinds of offence.
89
 Yet, even if this is not the case and the Otto-Preminger test ought to 
still be employed,
90
 there is no suggestion in Ghai that it was specifically religious feelings 
that were being protected. It is significant that at no point in the judgment was any attempt 
made to explain the exact kind of offence that the cremation ban was intended to prevent. 
Presumably it was just a vague sense of public disgust or queasiness at the very thought of 
human remains being burnt in an open funeral pyre − an example of what has been termed 
the ‗yuck factor‘.91 Yet this is surely far removed from extreme or gratuitous offence being 
caused to religious convictions, which was supposedly at issue in Otto Preminger.
92
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‘Engagement with the political, not the judicial, process’?  
It will be recalled that these backdrop features led directly to the Administrative Court‘s 
conclusion that this was a matter more appropriate for resolution by ‗elected representatives‘ 
than a court.  Consequently it was suggested that the applicant pursue his case by political 
rather than legal means, by lobbying and campaigning to change the legislative framework.
93
 
Had he not succeeded at the Court of Appeal this, of course, would have been an option for 
Mr Ghai but clearly, given that Hinduism per se, let alone that strand of orthodox Hinduism 
for which open air cremation is necessary, is a minority faith in the UK, his chances of 
success in the would appear to have been slim.   
Certainly, this is an area which demands a careful and balanced approach, with due 
regard accorded to cultural and religious sensitivities.  It probably is the case that the best 
forum for ultimately striking this kind of balance act is the political. But reliance on these 
arguments—that the appropriate process by which this issue should be addressed was not the 
judicial, but the political—resulted, in Ghai, in the Administrative Court wholly failing to 
carry out the task of weighing the competing factors itself.  It effectively abrogated its 
decision making power, handing it over wholesale to the elected arms of governance. This 
appears to come close to that very majoritarianism that the legal protection of human rights in 
a liberal democracy is intended to forestall. 
It is perhaps a trite point, but the Human Rights Act 1998 does not give courts the 
power to ‗strike down‘ primary legislation. The Act preserves the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Some have argued, however, that the HRA does provide the mechanisms by which a kind of 
constitutional dialogue may take place in which the courts are able to initiate a ‗conversation‘ 
with the other arms of governance as to the precise scope and content of Convention rights.
94
   
With this in mind, it is important to remember that even if the Administrative or the Appeal 
Court in Ghai had held the 1902 Act and the 2008 Regulations were in breach of Mr Ghai‘s 
article 9 rights, it would still have been for Parliament and Government to have put into effect 
remedial provisions, taking into account all of the factors raised. (Indeed it would have been 
open to them to have reasserted the ban in clearer terms—such is the consequence of the 
HRA‘s maintenance of Parliamentary sovereignty.) In all probability a finding of a breach 
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(by either the Administrative or the Appeal Court) would have led to calls for ‗elected 
representatives‘ to set up a workable regulatory framework that would have afforded respect 
to all the competing interests, including the deeply held religious convictions of orthodox 
Hindus.   
In contrast, however, the extremely deferential stance adopted by Cranston J would, 
but for the Court of Appeal‘s decision, have rendered any consideration by Government or 
Parliament unlikely, no matter what political lobbying Mr Ghai might have engaged in. 
Indeed, ironically, if orthodox Hindus had needed to campaign for legal reform, it seems 
likely that the Administrative Court‘s judgment in Ghai would have been used as evidence by 
the Government that British law was fully compliant with international human rights 
standards and that, as a consequence, there was no need for any change.  
 
 
4.   CREMATION, CULTURE AND THE COMMON LAW 
It is worth recalling that in Mr Ghai‘s case, the followers of his ‗strand of orthodox 
Hinduism‘95 believe that fire is the embodiment of the god Agni, and that their failure to 
perform a final sacrifice to him, by way of cremation on an outdoor funeral pyre (in strict 
accordance with the Vedic texts), will interrupt the cycle of birth/rebirth and harm the future 
course of the soul, perhaps irrevocably.
96
 The Administrative Court agreed that the 
performance of anthyesthi sanskara was a manifestation of the claimant‘s religious belief, 
and accepted that it was his ‗genuine belief, held in good faith‘ that were he not to be 
cremated on an open air funeral pyre there would be devastating results for him in the 
afterlife.
97
 However, and the point bears repetition, having acknowledged the absolute 
centrality of anthyesthi sanskara to the claimant‘s most fundamental beliefs, the 
Administrative Court then accepted the necessity of prohibiting this ritual merely in order to 
prevent offence to those who were not even going to witness it at first hand. 
 In effect the Administrative Court was saying: ‗We accept that you believe this ritual 
is crucial to your existence; and it is certainly not appropriate for us to inquire into the 
validity of your belief. And when it comes to manifesting your belief, as long as it‘s not 
trivial and makes sense, we are not going to probe too deeply‘. But then, at the pivotal point 
in its analysis, when the proportionality of the state‘s interference with the fundamental right 
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was to be assessed, and the manifestation of Ghai‘s belief had to be weighed against the 
public good, the Court was prepared to accept that the prevention of an attenuated form of 
secondary offence justified the prohibition of (what it had already accepted was) a 
subjectively crucial sacrament.  
 The Administrative Court‘s reasoning and decision in Ghai perhaps indicate a judicial 
reluctance to empathise with patterns of religious unorthodoxy, and a failure to take the 
imaginative leap of seeing the world from the perspective of the other, especially those whose 
beliefs it cannot even come close to comprehending.
98
 As long ago as the seventeenth 
century, Pierre Bayle used the technique of imagining the world from the perspective of those 
with other faiths as a means of forcing his opponents to confront the consequences of their 
own intolerance.
99
 More recently, Conor Gearty has argued that compassion might be a term 
upon which our modern human rights vocabulary could be built, because compassion has ‗a 
cognitive element (understanding the other), an affective element (feeling for the other) and a 
voluntarist element (doing something about the other).‘100 In a similar vein, Richard Rorty 
has argued that we need an increase in sentimental education, a need of a ‗progress of 
sentiments‘ leading to ‗an increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and 
people very unlike us as outweighing the differences‘.101 Thus, were the Administrative Court 
in Ghai to have made a leap of ‗imaginative identification‘,102 had it more obviously tried to 
see the universe from the perspective of the religious believer, its approach might have been 
very different. 
 Of course it must be acknowledged that matters relating to death generally and funeral 
rites in particular tend to be highly emotive. It is thus not difficult to see why, in areas such as 
these, judges proceed conservatively. However, such considerations aside, the history of the 
common law provides at least one pertinent example of a court displaying compassion and 
being willing to ‗step into the shoes of the believer‘. In 1884 Dr William Price a ‗surgeon, 
healer, Druid, vegetarian and self declared infidel‘ was prosecuted at Cardiff Assizes for the 
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cremation of his five month old son, Iesu Grist (who had died of natural causes).
103
 The great 
Victorian jurist, James Fitzjames Stephen, in adjudicating on the matter, directed the jury that 
a person who burns instead of burying a dead body did not commit an offence, unless he 
acted in such a manner as to amount to a public nuisance at common law.  
 
It is not my place to offer any opinion on the comparative merits of burning and 
burying corpses, but before I could hold that it must be a misdemeanor to burn a dead 
body, I must be satisfied not only that some people, or even that many people, object 
to the practice, but that it is, on plain, undeniable grounds, highly mischievous or 
grossly scandalous.  ... There are, no doubt, religious convictions and feelings 
connected with the subject which every one would wish to treat with respect and 
tenderness, and I suppose there is no doubt that as a matter of historical fact the disuse 
of burning bodies was due to the force of those sentiments. I do not think, however, 
that it can be said that every practice which startles and jars upon the religious 
sentiments of the majority of the population is for that reason a misdemeanor at 
common law. ... Though I think that to burn a dead body decently and inoffensively is 
not criminal, it is obvious that if it is done in such a manner as to be offensive to 
others it is a nuisance of an aggravated kind. A common nuisance is an act which 
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all Her Majesty‘s subjects. To burn a dead body in such a place and such a 
manner as to annoy persons passing along public roads or other places where they 
have a right to go is beyond all doubt a nuisance, as nothing more offensive both to 
sight and to smell can be imagined.
104
 
 
Stephen J, it is submitted, hit the nail on the head. It is striking that his interpretation of the 
common law position is a good deal more accommodating of religious freedom than that 
under statute, at least as interpreted by the Administrative Court. What makes this 
particularly noteworthy is that the Victorian age is hardly remembered as a time of 
enlightened tolerance in respect of cultural or religious diversity.
105
 Moreover, the ‗Victorian‘ 
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view of a ‗good death‘106 seems very different from such notions today in contemporary 
Britain.
107
 Thus, it is all the more surprising that the 19
th
 century common law position in 
respect of funeral rites appears more progressive than has (hitherto) been the case under the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
Herodotus, writing in the fifth century BCE, recounts a tale of Darius the Great, King of 
Persia: 
... he summoned the Greeks who happened to be at his court, and asked them what 
they would take to eat the dead bodies of their fathers.  They replied that they would 
not do it for any money in the world.  Later, in the presence of the Greeks ... he asked 
some Indians, of the tribe called Callatiae, who do in fact eat their parents‘ dead 
bodies, what they would take to burn them.  They uttered a cry of horror and forbade 
him to mention such a dreadful thing.  One can see by this what custom can do, and 
Pindar, in my opinion, was right when he called it ―king of all‖.108 
As a Zoroastrian Darius knew, of course, that the only correct way to dispose of the dead was 
by placing the corpse on a high tower to be devoured by vultures.
109
  
Herodotus used this anecdote to illustrate his contention that every society considers 
its own beliefs (and related practices) to be superior to those of others; and the fact that 
peoples can have such vastly differing beliefs and practices on the responses to a problem 
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which is common to all is evidence of the fact that that there is no morally right approach. On 
the contrary, the diverse practices of cultures are dictated by custom which is ‗king of all‘.110  
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Ghai that an outdoor funeral pyre (within a 
walled enclosure, open to the sun) is permitted, is good news for Hindus, Sikhs, and anyone 
else who wishes their mortal remains to be cremated in this way.  No doubt it was with great 
relief that the judges in the Court of Appeal, having ascertained that such an arrangement 
would satisfy Mr Ghai‘s beliefs, were able to resolve the issue through traditional methods of 
statutory construction, rather than having to tussle with the delicate task of balancing the 
religious faith of the minority against the supposed offense caused to the sensibilities of the 
majority.   
What is disturbing about the litigation, however, is the readiness of the Administrative 
Court (once it had found that the Cremation Act and associated regulations prohibited open 
air funeral pyres) to accept that the sincerely held religious beliefs of the individual could be 
overridden in order to protect the public from secondary offence, coupled with its willingness 
to shuffle off its decision making responsibility to the other arms of governance.  There is 
something of an irony here. For, as we have seen, under both the common law (R v Price) 
and under traditional canons of statutory interpretation (the Court of Appeal in Ghai) funeral 
pyres were found to be permitted.  But once the issue was framed in terms of human rights 
the claim was overridden with apparent ease. The invocation of a human right, with its 
associated exceptions, seems to have resulted in a weakening of protection for religious 
practices.  Contrary to what might have been expected, the very invocation of article 9 seems 
to have opened up the trap of cultural relativism identified by Herodotus, in this exact 
context, two and a half thousand years ago; for the assumed offence of the majority was used 
to justify the curtailment of minority religious practice. Under the Human Rights Act it 
seems, where claims to religious practice that might cause offence are concerned, as the 
‗Father of History‘ put it, custom is indeed the ‗king of all‘. 
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